ABSTRACT Quantum state sharing (QSTS) is a hot topic in quantum cryptography. However, majority of the current structures cannot resist the participant's fraud well during the initial state reconstruction phase. Especially, verifiable QSTS scheme which can be used to share unknown quantum state has yet to emerge. In this paper, we will propose the first verifiable structure by improving an existing threshold QSTS scheme. Our scheme has three merits: 1) it is easily realized in physical experiment because only the simple oneparticle unitary operations were involved; 2) each dishonest behavior of one participant could be detected by the next client; and 3) the private key of the dealer could be reused for many times.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography can provide unconditional security which classical cryptography has been striving for. Since the first quantum cryptography scheme BB84 [1] was put forward, many branches of quantum cryptography, such as quantum key distribution (QKD) [2] , [3] , quantum direct communication(QDC) [4] - [7] , and quantum key agreement(QKA) [8] , [9] , and so on, have been proposed.
Another hot topic in quantum cryptography is quantum secret sharing (QSS) which has attracted much attention from cryptographers and physicists owing to its important applications in quantum computing, secret key distribution, and unknown quantum state sharing. Quantum secret sharing generally falls into two categories. The first one is QSS scheme which shares the classical information by using the quantum channels. The second one is quantum state sharing (QSTS) scheme which shares the quantum information. In 1999, Hillery et al. [10] proposed the first QSS scheme by using the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state. In the same year, Cleve et al. [11] proposed a threshold QSS by adopting quantum error correcting code theory. Since then, many QSS schemes and QSTS schemes [12] - [20] have gained wide attention from all over the world. Especially, several threshold schemes [21] - [24] have been also proposed.
To date, although many QSS and QSTS schemes were proposed, few ones take into account the verification. That is to say, a majority of the threshold schemes only deal with the problems of how to reconstruct the initial key with all or part of the participants cooperating honestly in the secure quantum channels. However, in the realistic case, the dishonest participants can tell a lie in the process of reconstructing the secret key or unknown quantum state. To prevent the dishonest participants from providing fake shares at the reconstruction phase, Yang et al. [25] proposed a verifiable Quantum (k, n)-threshold scheme that can defeat the fraud of the malicious participant by using a post-verification mechanism. However, it is vulnerable to internal and external attacks [28] . In the following year, Yang et al. [26] proposed another one verifiable Quantum (k, n)-threshold scheme. In this scheme, each private subkey of the participants is appended a quantum tag which is used to resist the participant-in-middle attack. In 2016, Qin and Dai [27] proposed a verifiable (t,n) threshold quantum secret sharing by using d-dimensional Bell state . In addition to the former four schemes, there is no other literature to discuss the verification of QSS. However, these schemes only adapt to share classical information. Hence, searching for effective method to construct verifiable (t, n) threshold schemes adapting to share quantum information is more and more important theoretically and practically.
In 2017, Cao and Ma [24] (CM2017 scheme) proposed an efficient (t, n) threshold QSTS scheme. The linear equations were used to construct (t, n) threshold structure for the first time, and only single-particle unitary transformations were used in their scheme. However, the scheme cannot resist the participant's fraud well during the initial state reconstruction phase. In this paper, we will propose the first verifiable threshold QSTS scheme which can be used to share unknown quantum state by inserting some Bell states as dishonestdetection quantum pairs in the sharing of quantum state phase. As far as we know, this is the first verifiable threshold QSTS scheme. The proposed scheme possesses the following merits:
(1) Each deception of a dishonest participant Bob i j can be detected by the procession of dishonest-detection by the next participant.
(2) The master keys of the dealer Alice and the sub-keys of participants can be generated easily.
(3) The procedure can be implemented effectively and practically.
(4) The successful rate of the implementation is 100%. (5) The private key of the dealer could be reused for many times.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces some basic notions we will use in the paper, briefly recalls the CM2017 scheme, and describes the design method of the proposed scheme in detail. Section 3 analyzes the proposed scheme. Finally, in section 4, the conclusion of this paper is given.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED VERIFIABLE QSTS SCHEME
In this section, we will tackle some notations and properties about unitary operations and bell states. Next, we give a brief introduction of the CM2017 [24] scheme and ours follows.
A. UNITARY OPERATIONS AND BELL STATES
Define unitary transformation U (θ ) as follows:
Then the following property about U (θ ) and bell state
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE CM2017 SCHEME
Let Alice be the dealer and Bob i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n) be n participants. The dealer Alice intends to share a secret 1-particle quantum states sequence S,
, with the participants Bob i (i = 1, 2, . . . , n). When necessary, it requires any t out of the n participants could recover the secret sequence S. Here, let Bob i 1 , Bob i 2 , . . . , Bob i t be the participants who will reconstruct the initial secret quantum sequence S. The CM2017 scheme can be described as follows.
Initialization phase (1) Alice selects an infinite field F and n non-zero elements e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e n ∈ F as her private key.
(2) For each
Where
. . , i t with the first element i j . (3) Alice selects a non-zero element δ ∈ F randomly, and defines
B i is the private key of Bob i . Alice sends B i to Bob i by quantum secure direct communication method [4] - [7] .
Sharing of quantum state phase (1)Alice generates the secret 1-particle quantum states sequence S, and then get a new sequence S 0→1 by performing an unitary operation U (θ 0 )(θ 0 = 2π −δ) on each particle in S.
(2)Alice inserts some decoy particles which are selected from {|0 >, |1 >, |+ >=
, and gets a new sequence S 0→1 . Alice transmits S 0→1 to Bob i 1 .
(3) Bob i 1 executes eavesdropping checking with the help of Alice after receiving S 0→1 . If the error ratio is higher than the threshold value,then they abandon the scheme. Or else, they will continue. After successfully passed the eavesdropping checking, Bob i 1 extracts the sequence S 0→1 from the received sequence S 0→1 by deleting the decoy particles. Next, Bob i 1 will get a new sequence S 1→2 by performing an unitary operation U (θ 1 ) defined by equation (1) on each particle in S 0→1 , and inserts some decoy particles into S 1→2 . Here, (3)) on each quantum state in S t−1→t .
C. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPOSED VERIFIABLE QSTS SCHEME
Apparently, the CM2017 scheme only solves the problems of how to recovery the initial key sequence S with part of the participants cooperating honestly. However, if a certain dishonest participant Bob i j (j = 1, 2, . . . , t) tells a lie in the sharing of quantum state phase, Bob i t will not be able to extract the correct initial key sequence S. To resist the dishonest behavior from internal participants, we will improve the CM2017 scheme.
Initialization phase This phase is the same as CM2017 scheme. Sharing of quantum state phase (1)Alice generates the secret 1-particle quantum states sequence S, and then gets a new sequence S 0→1 by performing an unitary operation U (θ 0 )(θ 0 = 2π − δ) on each particle in S.
Besides, Alice prepares (t − 1) · seperately. Provided that the measurement results are still in the bell state |φ + >, then the procedure continues. Or else, it shows that Bob i 1 carried out some dishonest operations, and the scheme will be stopped. This procession is called dishonest-detection.
Next, after successfully passed the dishonest-detection, Bob i 2 will get the resulted sequence S 2→3 by deleting the dishonest-detection quantum pairs, and performs unitary operations U (θ 2 ) on S 2→3 , he will get a new sequence denoted by S 2→3 . Lastly, similar to (2), by inserting some decoy particles into S 2→3 , Bob i 2 will get a new sequence S 2→3 and transmits it to Bob i 3 .
This procedure continues until the participant Bob i t received the sequence S t−1→t from Bob i t−1 . (5)After successfully passed the eavesdropping checking and dishonest-detection, Bob i t will extract the sequence S t−1→t from the received sequence S t−1→t by deleting the decoy particles and dishonest-detection quantum pairs. Bob i t−1 can reconstruct the initial quantum state sequence S after performing the unitary transform U (θ t ) on each quantum state in S t−1→t .
III. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED VERIFIABLE QSTS SCHEME A. CORRECTNESS
Similar to the correctness of the CM2017 scheme, it is clear that Bob i t will recover the initial quantum state sequence S correctly if all the participants are honest in the sharing of quantum state phase. VOLUME 6, 2018
B. VERIFICATION AND SECURITY
(1) Consider the verification(or participant attack) of the proposed scheme. Suppose Bob i j (j = 1, 2, . . . , t − 1) is a dishonest participant. From the step (1) in sharing of quantum state phase, we can see that Bob i j doesn't know the positions of |φ
will be no longer bell states |ϕ + >. Hence, the dishonest behavior of Bob i j will be checked by Bob i j+1 .
Furthermore, consider another powerful attack known as collusive attack. In the worst case, all the participants except Bob i t , i.e., Bob i 1 , Bob i 2 , . . ., and Bob i t−1 are all dishonest, and they attempt to cooperate with each other to make the recipient Bob i t fail to obtain the quantum state sequence S correctly without being detected by Bob i t . However, the dishonest behaviors of them certainly will be detected by Bob i t because they do not know the positions of |φ
. Once they have tried performing incorrect unitary operations on the particles, then the dishonest-detection quantum pairs |φ
will be no longer bell states |ϕ + >. Hence, the dishonest behavior of them will be checked by Bob i t . That is to say, the proposed scheme can resist collusive attack.
(2) The scheme could resist the intercept-and-resend attack. Assume that the attacker Eve intercepts some particles sent by the dealer Alice or any participant Bob i , and resents a sequence with forged particles. Because of the procession of eavesdropping checking in our scheme, so Eve would surely cause some errors owing to his complete ignorance of the positions, bases and values of the decoy particles. Then the Eve will be detected with the probability which will converge to 1 when the number of decoy states is large enough.
(3) The scheme could resist the entangling attack. Assume that the attacker Eve intercepts a transmitting particle transmitted from Bob i j−1 to Bob i j , and performs an unitary operation U e on the intercepted particle to entangle an ancillary particle |E > prepared beforehand by Eve. The unitary operation U e can be defined by the following equations [29] :
Where |e 00 >, |e 01 >, |e 10 >, and |e 11 > are pure states decided by the unitary operation U e , and the amplitude u 00 , u 01 , u 10 , and u 11 satisfy u 2 00 + u 2 01 = 1 and u 2 10 + u 2 11 = 1 . Then it is easy to get: In order to pass the eavesdropping checking, Eve has to set u 01 = u 10 = 0 and u 00 = u 11 = 1 if the decoy particle belongs to {|0 >, |1 >}. Then we have (U e (|+ > |E >) = (4) The scheme could resist the photon-number-splitting attack. If all participants test sequence sample using the technology of photon number splitter when they receive particles, then the photon-number-splitting attack is of no use.
C. COMPARISON WITH OTHER SCHEMES
Within the most of existing (t, n) threshold schemes, the efficiency is relatively low owing to the sophisticated computations such as quantum error-correcting encoding or Lagrange interpolation. More important, the dishonest behavior can not be detected timely. Three verifiable Quantum (k, n)-threshold schemes [25] - [27] also contain complicated process. Furthermore, only classic secret can be shared in these schemes. Compared to existing (t, n) threshold schemes, the proposed scheme possesses three merits. Firstly, each deception of a dishonest participant can be detected by the next participant through the procession of dishonest-detection. Secondly, the master keys of the dealer Alice and the subkeys of participants can be generated easily, and the whole procedure can be implemented effectively and practically. Thirdly, the master private key of the dealer could be reused for many times owing to the randomness of the solutions to the linear equations.Furthermore, if the dealer and all the participants cooperate honestly, the successful rate of the implementation will be 100%.
IV. CONCLUSION
Threshold QSTS scheme is a hot topic in quantum cryptography owing to its important applications in quantum computing, secret key distribution, and unknown quantum state sharing. In this paper, we propose a verifiable threshold QSTS structure which can be used to share unknown quantum state. Furthermore, each dishonest participant can be detected by others. As far as we know, this is the first verifiable threshold QSTS scheme. Security analysis shows that it is immune to participant attack, intercept-and-resend attack, and entangling attack. Compared to existing (t, n) threshold schemes, it possesses several merits such as delectability of dishonest participant, simple operation, high efficiency, and easy to implement.
